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Economics: The Precocious Social Science
Gayatri Sarin
Section 1.1 Introduction
The perception that economics no longer fits
squarely into the domain of the social sciences enjoyed a
brief bout of attention from philosophers of science in the
early 1980s. Thereafter, interest in the scientific status of
economics has waned, on at least one account, because
economists ‘are not particularly anxious about the scientific
respectability of their discipline’ (Rosenberg 1983). The title
of the article by Gordon (1978) “Should Economists Pay
Attention to Philosophers?” (his answer is a firm ‘no’) is
telling of the attitude to the debate, and the reluctance of
philosophers and economists alike to participate in it.
Nevertheless, economic theories are powerful tools that
shape the landscape of politics and so deserve to be
scrutinized by philosophers of science.
This paper evaluates some of the criticisms leveled
against the methodology of economics in order to discuss
whether economics can ever attain a status comparable to
that of the natural sciences. The aim is to paint a picture of
what modern economics is by comparing it with historical
developments in the sciences. It is my contention that the
problems economics faces are the same as those historically
faced by the physical sciences and if they differ, they do so
in degree alone, and not in kind. Further, the fact that
economics deals with human beings may forever closet it in
the social science buildings, however, the empirical rigor of
its claims can, in principle, be at par with those of the
physical sciences.
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Section 1.2. Science and Demarcation Criteria
For the purpose of this paper, I will draw on the work
of Thagard to discuss some general criteria for evaluating
the scientific status of a discipline. His principles will
provide the structural framework of my defense of the
empirical status of the subject of economics. I have selected
his principles because they build on the strengths of Kuhn’s,
Popper’s and Lakatos’ demarcation criteria, and outline
some generally agreed upon characteristics of good science.
Though none of the following criteria guarantee a theory a
place in scientific community, when taken together they
provide a fairly accurate picture of how science should be:
Briefly, for a discipline to be considered scientific, it needs
to be:
1. Verifiable – ‘A theory is said to be verifiable if it is
possible to deduce observation statements from it’
(Thagard 1978). The derivation of observation
statements links to the second criterion - falsification.
2. Falsifiable – Through experimentation, a theory or its
claims must be potentially falsifiable. Though
falsification can sometimes only occur once a better
theory comes along, the proliferation of modifying
auxiliary hypotheses to “save” a theory reveal a
theory’s lack of falsifiability.
3. Have an appropriate ‘Theory, Community and
Historical Context’ – ‘theory’ delineates the familiar
elements of ‘structure, prediction, explanation and
problem solving’ of the heuristic apparatus of the
subject. Thagard puts special emphasis on the nature
of the community of practitioners of a discipline in
that he asks, ‘Are the practitioners in agreement on
the principles of the theory?’; ‘Are they actively
involved in attempts at confirming and disconfirming
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their theory?’ (Thagard 1978). If one answers no the
above questions, the theory in question should be
considered pseudo-scientific. Even if the theory fulfills
this criterion, it could fail to be scientific if it has been
less progressive than alternative theories over a long
period of time (historical context), or if there has been
little effort to increase the scope and accuracy of its
explanations (progressiveness).
With these criteria in mind, I proceed to investigate the
claims made against economics, in light of its alleged failure
to qualify as an empirically scientific discipline.
Section 2.1. – Verifiability and Controlled Experiments
In Philosophy of Natural Science, Carl Hempel
discusses the importance of testability in the demarcation
between science and non-science. He rejects the idea that a
theory without testable implications can ever be considered
to have scientific content:
If a statement or set of statements is
not testable at least in principle, in
other words, if it has no test
implications at all, then it cannot be a
scientific hypothesis or theory, for no
conceivable empirical findings can
then accord or conflict with it. –
Hempel Philosophy of Natural
Science
If there exists no encounter of a theory with the empirical
world that can potentially verify its claims, the theory must
be tossed out as non-science. The first objection to the status
of economics as a science deals with the heuristic apparatus
of the subject.
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Edward Leamer, an influential economist,
acknowledges the characteristic preponderance of debate
and scarcity of agreement between the various schools of
economic thought. The prolonged limbo between acceptance
and rejection of theories in economics is linked to this first
major criticism of the subject: Its inability to produce
controlled experiments. For the predictions of any science to
bear any conviction, they need to be testable in the empirical
world. It has been argued that the methodology of
economics, making sweeping assumptions that –
notwithstanding reality - are difficult to test out, guards it
from ever being falsified through experimentation.
Economists regularly jump to the task of making policy
recommendations, ‘despite the lack of a single accepted
theory’ (Leamer1996) making their claims rather dubious.
Experimentation is thus the crucial hurdle that is needed for
a discipline that relies on subjective interpretation to convey
its findings.
Historically speaking though, Astronomy and
Cosmology faced similar difficulties in controlled testing but
still managed to secure a position in the scientific
community. Many young sciences that began with limited
data have been able to extract scientific theories from the
natural experiments available for study. For example,
Lindzen’s (1990) reference1 to narrative of the development
of the diurnal nature of tides in atmospheric sciences makes
economics seem like it might be on a similar trajectory:
For a long time theory and data
leapfrogged each other, with theory
postulating mechanisms on which
little data were available, the data
1

In Leamer (1996)
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becoming available and contradicting
the theory and new theory then
emerging. Because the amount of data
was large and it was error ridden,
something like what economists call
reduced-form modeling went on
continually in order to extract patterns
from the noisy data.
Economics faces the same problems that atmospheric
science once faced in that there is sometimes a natural
barrier against experimentation2. Since the subjects of study
in economics are human beings, on whom experimentation
(with taxes, migration, poverty) may not be permissible, the
best an economist can do is to seek out natural experiments
from history to test a theory. Ideal test conditions resemble
sudden shocks to the economy, like a sudden influx of
immigrants, a crop failure, or a trade boom, where ceteris
paribus conditions roughly. A popular joke among
economists is that sometimes, “Doing econometrics is like
trying to learn the laws of electricity by playing the radio”
(Leamer 1983), a reference to the rudimentary tools
available for economic analysis.
When economists spot powerful natural experiments,
the tests of their theories become more robust. When
theories hold over several different data sets and are
confirmed by different economists, they gain objectivity.
This methodology is well established in the medical
practice, where often the assessment of evidence is
statistical, or probabilistic, and theories are technically at the
most only verifiable through tests, though no less scientific.
2

Laboratory testing, widespread in experimental economics does
actually involve controlled tests. Experimental economists are a minority
in the profession, but will likely be more commonplace in the future.
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The debate about the effect of smoking on lung cancer
developed along similar lines, where correlations between
the two variables were measured in different populations to
expose a causal connection between the two.
The fact that economics may seem to proceed
without making testable observation statements probably
comes from a misguided expectation of natural science-like
experiments from the economics department. A broader
perspective on the development of sciences reveals that
several other disciplines faced the same problem with
experimentation and verification (in differing degrees) and
still attained a scientific standing.
Section 2.2 Confirmation and Diversity
Another expectation of a science is that it must not
develop in isolation from the web of knowledge developing
around it. The more a theory is corroborated with existing
sciences, the better the chances of it being considered a
science itself. On the view of Buchannan and Vanberg
(1990), the retrospective approach that economics takes is
very similar to the approach taken by earlier versions of
evolutionary theory. I would argue that economics today
might look quite similar to what evolutionary theory looked
like soon after Darwin’s ‘On the Origins of Species’. In both
disciplines, the intuition of a central unyielding trend (in
evolution- natural selection; in economics- the invisible
hand of the market) is used to explore and systematize a
range of possible theories by seeking out experiments in the
natural world. Both deal with phenomena that have strong
stochastic elements that often vary rapidly over time, and
neither are able to specify crucial tests. Evolutionary theory
has been inducted into science because it has received
confirmation from a wide range of academic disciplines.
Geology, Biology, Archeology and Paleontology have all
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produced evidence in support of evolutionary theory, so
though none have conclusively proven the phenomena, the
diversity in its sources of confirmation makes the case for its
likely truth. Whether the claims put forward by economists
have been confirmed in a variety of disciplines will be
important to evaluating its scientific standing.
Given that most of economics does not use
controlled experiments to test out theories, one might think
that confirmation is a vague and subjective issue in
economics. Though, accepted, the greater need for
interpretation in economics makes confirmation of theories
less straightforward, there are conventions in place that lay
out the economist’s equivalent of “good science”. A good
economist would reserve his judgment on a theory until it
has been shown to hold in a variety of contexts, times and
places. For example, expansionary fiscal policy that would
work to circumvent a recession in Costa Rica, might cause
hyperinflation in Zimbabwe, because the institutions there
are much weaker. This indicates that results in economics
are less generalizable, and may seem opaque to the noneconomist. Within the discipline, however, there is a
formalized standard battery of tests to confirm and evaluate
a theory. Conventions such as robustness tests of errors, a
decent R-square3, a coefficient magnitude that has some
meaning4 and statistical significance at the 5% level5, all
indicate that the ‘community of practitioners’ is actively
seeking to test and confirm economic theories in a variety of
contexts.
3

It measures the percentage of variation in data explained by the model
Sometimes coefficients are statistically significant (not 0), but are so
close to 0 that in economic terms they have no meaning.
5
There is less than 5% of a chance that the result observed would have
obtained if there was no significant correlation between the variables.
4
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Section 2.3. Scope of Explanations and Accuracy of
Predictions
In 1983, when Rosenberg was writing about the state
of economics as a science he argued that it failed to be a
progressive research program because neither was the
precision of its predictions improving, nor was the scope of
its explanations increasing. These now dated criticisms
provide an ideal opportunity to discuss how economics
today looks very different from economics twenty-five years
ago.
In terms of scope, experimental and behavioral
economics have made vast contributions to the subject of
economics in the past few decades. Voter turnout, behavior
of the family, investments in human capital, crime and
punishment, game theory, institutions, business cycles,
learning curves all show that economics is lending and
borrowing from the other social sciences. The scope of
economics has increased so rapidly as to prompt a
reactionary movement dubbed ‘economic imperialism’ in
the other social sciences. I am a firm believer that no science
that purports to explain everything should really be called a
science (as per Popper’s demarcation criteria). But that more
aspects of human behavior can now be explained in
economic terms shows that economics is becoming
increasingly corroborated with other academic disciplines.
The lending and borrowing of tools from statistics and
mathematics6, coupled with the creation of new subfields
6

Another fundamental development in economics, worth mentioning is
in macroeconomics. In the last few decades for the first time
macroeconomists started to explicitly model time. Prior to this
macroeconomics hinged on an ‘enormous compression of time’,
making its models simple, elegant but incomprehensible in terms of
how their predictions bore out in the real world (Levine 2008). The
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like behavioral economics all indicate that economics is
contributing to and expanding the web of science.
Section 3.1. The Empirical Status of Economics
Thus far, I have addressed some of the
common objections to economic methodology. In no
way do I think that economics could or should
attempt to become a natural science, simply because
its object of study is not the natural world. What is
interesting to me is whether its predictions and
theories can attain the empirical rigor accorded to the
hard sciences. I have found that many areas of study
that now belong to the hard sciences have initially
faced difficulties like the absence of controlled
experiments, the need to interpret the results with
limitations in objectivity, and so these should not
rule out the possibility of economics becoming a
more empirical science.
A common angle taken on by denouncers of the
empirical status of economics has to do with its
mathematical form. A good amount of microeconomic
theory is entirely deducible from a handful of axioms and a
basic understanding of calculus. For example, the law of
demand is deducible from a mathematical feature of the
shape of utility curves (that they are concave). The core of
microeconomic theory is sometimes viewed as so immutable
dynamic modeling of time made possible a distinction between short
run effects and long run effects of policy changes, making
fundamental contributions to the predictive scope of macroeconomic
models itself. Macroeconomic models today bear little resemblance to
their elegant predecessors, a change deliberately made to increase the
empirical content of the subject at the cost of conventional attributes
of theories.
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that its claims are in simple logical truisms that are devoid of
empirical content, and so cannot be considered scientific.
Rosenberg (1984) initially articulated this objection
by making the analogy between geometry and economics.
He asserted that economic theory relied on a set of
mathematically convenient assumptions, which had the twofold effect of making the theory rich in conceptual clarity,
but poor in empirical content. In the process of abstracting
away from the complexities of human interactions,
economists had landed up creating a discipline quite like
Euclidean geometry for which no empirical correlates
existed. He recommended that economics should thus be
treated as ‘a pure axiomatic system, whose terms may or
may not be instantiated in the real world, but which is of
great interest, like Euclidean geometry, whether or not its
objects really exist’ (p390).
What I would point out here, is that the chief goal of
economics is to be a rich theoretical tradition. It is true that
certain nuggets of economic theory seem pre-ordained to be
in the economics textbooks, as if it were an unwritten rule
agreed on by the profession, but undergraduate economics
textbooks do not define the status of the discipline. Levine
(2009) went as far as to say that ‘undegraduate economics
textbooks were an embarrassment to the profession’ because
they were not consistent with the graduate textbooks that
more accurately reflect the profession as it is today. Most of
the empirical developments in economics happen at the
Ph.D level and do not filter down to the general public.
What is perceptible to the general public is introductory
economic theory and economic policy, both of which have
serious disconnects from the core of the profession. An
analysis of the work done by nobel-laureate types of
economists would, I think, speak for the empirical
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achievements of the subject, because economic theories
today are merited on their explanatory power not just their
mathematical elegance.
Also, the fact that economic theories are
verifiable only within a certain range of error is, I
think, well explained by the fact that economists
study the reactions of human beings. And human
beings are intrinsically erratic, and predictable with
only so much certainty. Climatologists, given the
nature of the phenomena they study, also have only
so much certainty in their predictions. I think modern
economics has more consistent predictions than
climatologists do, and this warrants approval from
the scientific community. A massive economic
recession here and there is like every odd natural
disaster that the climatologists fail to predict. Both
can be studied in retrospect.
Section 3.2 Commensurability and Empirical Progress
Once a scientific theory is established, there is the
expectation that predictions will have strong empirical
correspondence to the real world. The physical sciences, rich
in empirical content, claim to be ‘carving the world at its
joints’, because the earlier models or theories are
commensurable with their successors (at least in normal
science). So for economics, it will not suffice to tell us just
the logical outcomes of its models if it is to be any more
than a tautological science. Rosenberg (1983) initially
defends the economist by pointing to the development of
heredity from the Mendelian gene.
There are several scientific theories which to
varying degrees fail to divide nature at its
joints. For instance, the Mendelian unit of
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inheritance cannot be reduced to the
molecular gene and so does not divide its
phenomena at the joints. Yet Mendel’s laws
are useful approximations that we would be
silly to forgo.
The purpose of models in economics ‘whether
mathematical or verbal’ is to serve as metaphors
(Leamer 1996). For Keynes, to convert a model into
a quantitative formula was to ‘destroy its usefulness
as an instrument of thought’ (Keynes 1938). Leamer
(1996) sums up the matter in this oft quoted
statement: ‘Models are neither true nor false. They
are sometimes useful and sometimes misleading’. A
useful way of seeing their relation to the empirical
world is to compare them to the Ideal Gas Laws. The
predictions are unambiguous only on a range of
phenomena, and like the Ideal Gas Laws, they break
down at (the economic equivalents of) extremes of
temperature, pressure or volume. Whilst many
people think that the assumption of rationality is
rigid in economic models, it is really only a
simplifying assumption (when irrationality in either
direction cancels itself out) that is suspended when
required by the phenomena being studied (for
example stock bubbles).
As per Keynes’ standard description of economics:
“Economics is a science of thinking in terms
of models joined to the art of choosing
models which are relevant to the
contemporary world. It is compelled to be
this, because unlike the typical natural
science, the material to which it is applied is,

154

in too many respects, not homogenous
through time.
The final objection I would like to address
comes from the end of Rosenberg’s article "If
economics isn't a science, what is it?". He claims that
no improvement in economic theory could provide
‘laws governing intentional economic activities’,
because the claims derived from the fundamental
assumptions about the determinants of individual
actions (that people act rationally) ‘can be shown to
follow from assumptions which are in direct denial’
of the ones economists cite. His argument is that the
general statements made in economics can often be
shown to be derivable from different starting
assumptions, some of which may be contradictory.
This was certainly true of consumer choice theory
prior to Bentham, which focused on deriving the
same law of demand from a cardinal notion of
utility7. Bentham decisively showed that the same
microeconomic laws could be derived from an
ordinal notion of utility (that consumers need only be
able to order their preferences making interpersonal
comparisons of utility impossible).
However, one glance at the work of Kuhn
would convince anyone that this is a problem shared
by each one of the hard sciences, and if present in
economics, is only so to a greater degree. The very
basis for Kuhnian paradigm shifts was that
revolutions in the scientific world were prompted by
7

This meant that consumers had to be able to assign a numeric value to
the utility derived from different bundles of goods
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sudden changes in the underlying assumptions of
theory, the workhorse example being the switch from
Newtonian mechanics to general relativity.
In conclusion, I reiterate that each of the
objections presented to the scientific status of
economics apply (or have applied) in varying
degrees to other disciplines that are currently deemed
scientific. None of them satisfactorily rule out the
possibility that economics can in the future be
considered an empirical science. This observation
opens up two interesting lines of discussion. The first
is that scientific status is transient and temporal in
nature. Disciplines can shift between being
considered scientific and pseuodoscientific over time
based on the trajectory that they take up. Thagard
points out that astrology – though now considered a
pseudo-science, should rightly have been considered
a science earlier in time because it did not fail the
demarcation criteria until more recent times. One of
the reasons he cites is that there weren’t any
contending theories that better explained the
phenomena that concerned astrology until recent
developments in science. This points to the second
interesting observation: the line between science and
pseudoscience has as much to do with developments
outside of the discipline (alternative explanations of
the same phenomena), as with the methodology
employed within the discipline.
The methodology employed by economics, in
my assessment satisfies to some degree, each of the
criteria for good science. Whether economics will
eventually be considered a science depends both on
developments within the discipline as well as how
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successful contending explanations of the same
phenomena are. While I reserve my judgment on its
eventual status, I assert that the arguments presented
thus far do not rule out the possibility that economics
can one day be at par with the other sciences.

Bibliography
Blaug, Mark. "Paradigms versus research programs in the
history of economics." 1976. The Philosophy of
Economics An Anthology. By Daniel M. Hausman.
New York: Cambridge UP, 1994. Print.
Buchanan, James, and Viktor J. Vanberg. "The Market as a
Creative Process." 1990. The Philosophy of
Economics An Anthology. By Daniel M. Hausman.
New York: Cambridge UP, 1994. Print.
Friedman, Milton. "The Methodology of Positive
Economics." 1952. The Philosophy of Economics An
Anthology. By Daniel M. Hausman. New York:
Cambridge UP, 1994. Print.
Keynes, John M. Economic Model Construction and
econometrics. 1938. The Philosophy of Economics
An Anthology. New York: Cambridge UP, 1994.
Print.
Lakatos, Imre. “Science and Pseudo-Science” 1973.
Philosophy of Science. By Curd, M & Cover, J.A.
New York:1998. Print.
Leamer, Edward E. "Let's Take the Con Out of
Econometrics." Journal of Economic Perspectives
73.March (1983). Print.
Leamer, Edward. "Questions, Theory and Data." N. pag.

157

Print.
Rosenberg, Alex .. "If economics isn't a science, what is it?"
1983. The Philosophy of Economics An Anthology.
Comp. Daniel M. Hausman. New York: Cambridge
UP, 1994. Print.
Sims, Christopher A. "Macroeconomics and Methodology."
Journal of Economic Perspectives 10.Winter (1996).
Print.
Thagard, P. “Why Astrology is a pseudoscience”.
Philosophy of Science. By Curd, M & Cover, J.A.
New York:1998. Print.

